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LEGISLATION
GOVERNMET CONTRACTS-FINALITY CLAUSES-JUDICIAL REvIEW OP ADMINISTRATIVE
DEcisioNs.-Criticism of the holding in United States v. Wunderlichl in 1951 led be-
latedly to the enactment of Public Law No. 3562 by Congress in 1954, and restored
judicial review of decisions of heads of departments or their representatives where
questions of fact arose under the disputes clause in government contracts. United
States v. Wunderlich had held that under Article 153 of the standard Government
contract, the decision of the head of a department was final and not subject to re-
view, in the absence of proof of conscious wrongdoing on the part of' the contract-
ing officer or of the head of the department, or of an intention on their part to cheat
or defraud the contractor. The decision would be final, despite the fact that it may
have been arbitrary, capricious, grossly in error or unsupported by substantial evi-
dence. Writing for the majority, Mr. Justice Minton held that if the findings under
Article 15 were to be set aside on the ground that there was fraud in the adminis-
trative determination, the fraud would have to be alleged and proved, as fraud
would not be presumed. 4
In a sharp, separate dissent,5 Mr. Justice Jackson said: "I think that we should
adhere to the rule that where the decision of the contracting officer or department
head shows 'such gross mistake as necessarily to imply bad faith,' there is a judicial
remedy, even if it has its origin in overzeal for the department, negligence of the
deciding official, misrepresentations-however innocent-by subordinates, prejudice
against the contractor, or other causes that fall short of actual corruption. Men are
more often bribed by their loyalties and ambitions than by money. I still believe
one should be allowed to have a judicial hearing before his business can be destroyed
by administrative action, although the Court again thinks otherwise." 6
The majority opinion, however, suggested another approach toward a solution:
"If the standard of fraud that we adhere to is too limited, that is a matter for Con-
gress." 7 After an interval of some three years, Congress accepted the Court's' open
invitation and enacted Public Law 356.
This law provides that no clause in any Government contract which relates to
the finality or conclusiveness of a determination by a department or agency shall be
pleaded as limiting judicial review of such determination, where it is alleged that the
decision is "fraudulent, or capricious or so arbitrary or so grossly erroneous as neces-
sarily to imply bad faith, or is not supported by substantial evidence." s In a retro-
active feature, the act also permitted judicial review of any suit already filed. And
Section 2 of the act prohibited inclusion of any provision in a Government contract
1 342 U. S. 98, 72 S. Ct. 154, 96 L. ed. 113.
2 83rd Cong., 2d Sess., May 11, 1954, 68 STAT. 81.
3 "Article 15. Disputes.-Except as otherwise specifically provided in this con-
tract, all disputes concerning question of fact arising under this contract shall be de-
cided by the contracting officer subject to written appeal by the contractor within
30 days to the head of the department concerned or his duly authorized representa-
tive, whose decision shall be final and conclusive upon the parties thereto. In the
meantime the contractor shall diligently proceed with the work as directed."
4 342 U. S. at 100, 72 S. Ct. at 155, 96 L. ed. at 115.
5 Mr. Justice Douglas dissented in a separate opinion, in which he was joined
by Mr. Justice Reed.
6 342 U. S. at 103, 72 S. Ct. at 157, 96 L. ed. at 117.
7 342 U. S. at 100, 72 S. Ct. at 156, 96 L. ed. at 116.
8 Supra, note 2.
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which would make final the decision of an administrative official, representative or
board on a question of law.
Prior to the Wunderlich decision, the Court took the position in several cases9
that administrative decisions were not to be considered as final where they were
arbitrary, capricious or so in error as to imply bad faith in their preparation. The
action of Congress therefore restored to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court a
segment of judicial review which it had voluntarily relinquished by a strict reading
of Government contract legislation. It also reaffirmed the historical separation of
powers principle, by denying to the executive division "the assumption of such a
duty which normally reposes in the judiciary branch of the Government."'10
ComPARATIvE NEGLIGENCE STATUTEs-FAILuRE or NFw YoRr. STATE LEGISLATURE
TO PASS PROPOSED LE0isLATioN.-In its 1954 session, the New York State Legisla-
ture once again failed to pass the comparative negligence legislation introduced before
it.1 Such legislation would do away with the strict common-law doctrine of con-
tributory negligence now in effect in this state, which denies recovery to any plain-
tiff whose negligence, no matter how slight, contributed to his injury.2
Dissatisfaction with the contributory negligence rule has been expressed by the
Supreme Court of Minnesota in Haeg v. Sprague, Warner and Co.
"No one can appreciate more than we the hardship of depriving plaintiff of his
verdict and of all right to collect damages from defendant; but the rule of contribu-
tory negligence, through no fault of ours, remains in our law and gives us no alter-
native other than to hold that defendant is entitled to judgment non obstante vere-
dicto. It would be hard to imagine a case more illustrative of the truth that in
operation the rule of comparative negligence would serve justice more faithfully than
that of contributory negligence. . . . But as long as the legislature refuses to substi-
tute the rule of comparative for that of contributory negligence we have no option
but to enforce the law in a proper case."
Relaxation or elimination of the doctrine of contributory negligence in the form
of comparative negligence legislation would permit an apportionment of the damages
between plaintiff and defendant with regard to the degree of fault of each. 4
In the last two. years in New York, two different bills on comparative negli-
gence were introduced in the legislature. Both failed to come to a vote. In the 1953
9 See Moorman v. United States, 338 U. S. 457, 461, 70 S. Ct. 288, 290, 94
L. ed. 256, 259 (1949); Kihlberg v. United States, 97 U. S. 398, 402, 24 L. ed.
1106, 1108, 13 Ct. Cl. 148 (1878); Sweeney v. United States, 109 U. S. 618, 620,
3 S. Ct. 344, 27 L. ed. 1053 (1883); Ripley v. United States, 223 U. S. 695, 704,
32 S. Ct. 352, 355, 56 L. ed. 614, 619 (1912).
10 H. Rep. No. 1380, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1954).
1 New York State Bar Association, Circular No. 84, p. 335 (MAy 3, 1954).
2 The Association of the Bar of the City of New York (Committee on Law
Reform), Report on the Comparative Negligence Rule, pp. 1-2 (1953).
3 202 Minn. 425, 281 N. W. 261, 263 (1938). See MeCulloch v. Horton, 105
Mont. 531, 74 P. 2d 1 (1937).
4 Peck, REPORT ON JUSTICE, 16-7 (1953); Teller, Proposed Comparative Negli-
gence Law, 5 Brooklyn Barrister 100 (1954); 1 Thompson, COMr2MTARIES ON I=
LAw or NEGLIGENCE, § 170 (Indianapolis, 1901); quoted with approval in McCul-
loch v. Horton, supra.
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session, and again in 1954, Senator Pliny Williamson proposed a bill 5 which pro-
vided that:
"In all actions to recover damages for injury to person or property, the con-
tributory negligence of the plaintiff shall not bar a recovery but the damages recov-
erable shall be reduced to such extent as the court deems just and equitable and
having regard to the amount of negligence attributable to plaintiff."
The Williamson bill left the finding as to the degree of negligence to the court,
and not to the jury. Under this bill the court is not bound to apportion the damages
according to the relative degrees of negligence, but may act at its own discretion
in so making an apportionment. This bill has thus been criticized as being in vio-
lation of Article I, Section 2 of the New York State Constitution 6 since it is con-
tended that the quantum of negligence is a fact and must be subject to determina-
tion by a jury.
.With the above criticism in view, a modification of the Williamson bill was
proposed by Assemblyman Ludwig Teller in the 1954 Session7 and reintroduced
again in 1955.8 The Teller Bill, which was buried in the Judiciary Committee in
1954 and is in the hands of the Judiciary Committee at the present time, provides
that:
"In all actions to recover damages for injury to person or property, the con-
tributory negligence of the plaintiff, providing it is lesser in degree than the negli-
gence of the defendant, shall not bar a recovery, but the damages recoverable shall
be reduced by the trier of the facts in proportion to the degree of negligence at-
tributable to the plaintiff. In such cases the trier of the facts shall make known the
total amount of damages found, and the amount by which they were reduced."
Under this proposal, the question of the degree of negligence is left to the jury
and recovery is permitted only where the plaintiff is less negligent than the de-
fendant. This would bar a plaintiff who was primarily responsible for an accident
from recovering from a defendant whose fault was comparatively slight.
These bills must be viewed against the background of two comparative negli-
gence statutes now in effect, and a proposed modification of one of them which typifies
several aspects of such legislation.
Mississippi has a so-called "full" comparative negligence statute,9 which provides:
"In all actions hereafter brought for personal injuries, or where such injuries
have resulted in death, or for injury to property, the fact that the person injured,
or the owner of the property, or the person having control over the property may have
been guilty of contributory negligence shall not bar a recovery, but damages shall be
reduced by the jury in proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to the
person injured or the owner of the property, or the person having control over the
property."
Sen. Int. No. 1097, Pr. 1142 (1954). Sen. Int. Bill No. 25 (1953).
6 "Trial by jury in all cases in which it has heretofore been guaranteed shall
remain inviolate forever." N. Y. CoNsT., Art. 1, § 2. In suits at common law .. .
the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by jury, shall be
otherwise reexamined in any court of the United States, than according to the rules
of common law." U. S. CoNsT., amend. VII. Holmes, THE COMON LAW, 122
(Boston, 1923); Kreindler, Comparative Negligence in New York, 11 Bar Bull.
(N. Y. County Law. Assoc.) 81, 84-5 (1953).
7 Ass. Int. No. 3066, Pr. A. 3190.
8 Ass. Int. No. 702, Pr. A. 704.
1) MIss. CODE or 1942, § 1454.
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This statute permits recovery by a plaintiff, no matter how great his fault, pro-
viding he is less than 100 per cent negligent. Thus, a slightly negligent defendant
may be required to pay a money judgment over to a much more negligent plaintiff.' 0
On the other hand, the Wisconsin law1 1 permits recovery only ", . if such neg-
ligence was not as great as the negligence of the person against whom recovery is
sought. . . ." Thus, if a claimant is 49 per cent negligent, he may be awarded the
remaining 51 per cent of his damages, but if he is 50 per cent negligent he is denied
recovery. Thus, a difference of one per cent in the quantum of negligence would
determine whether plaintiff would be entitled to a partial verdict or would be denied
any judicial relief.
1 2
McKinnon, in his article opposing comparative negligence,' 3 discusses a suggested
modification of the Wisconsin law which would compute the plaintiff's recovery by
subtracting his per cent of negligence from the per cent of negligence of the de-
fendant. Thus, if the plaintiff were 49 per cent negligent and the defendant were
51 per cent negligent, the plaintiff would recover the difference, or two per cent
of his total damages.
Because of the sharp decline in plaintiff's recovery as his percentage of negli-
gence increased (plus the fact that there would be no recovery where both parties
were equally negligent), this type of legislation would be most acceptable to insurance
companies and other supporters of the contributory negligence rule.
It is argued on behalf of retaining the contributory negligence rule that where
a plaintiff has contributed to an accident he becomes a partner in it and, but for his
own negligence, the accident would not have occurred.
1 4
It is further contended that the comparative negligence rule would result In a
substantial increase in large jury verdicts, thus resulting in higher insurance rates
which, in turn would result in a greater percentage of the population without ade-
quate insurance coverage. Consequently, it is argued that there would be a higher
percentage of accidents in which the liable party defendant would be judgment proof.1 5
It is further argued for retention of the contributory negligence rule that the
jurors would find it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to measure negligence in
terms of percentages. In order to make such a calculation, there must be something
capable of being measured. In this situation it is contended that the jury is faced
with something intangible, the presence or absence of which is difficult enough to
ascertain, to say nothing of, measurement in terms of amounts or degrees.16
Those supporting the rule of comparative negligence contend that it provides
a just and equitable division of the burden of the cost of an accident since liability,
no matter how great or small, is measured by the degrees of fault of the respective
parties.17
10 Crosby Lumber & Mfg. Co. v. Durham; 181 Miss. 559, 562, 179 So. 2d
285, 288 (1938).
11 Wisc. STAT. § 331.045.
12 Cherney v. Holmes, 185 F. 2d 718, 720 (1950) "under Wisconsin statutory
law, 50% negligence bars recovery."
13 McKinnon, The Case against Comparative Negligence, 28 Calif. S. B. J. 23,
29 (1953).
14 Id. at 25.
15 Id. at 31.
16 Id. at 26-7.
17 Association of the Bar of the City of New York, op. cit. supra note 2 at 9. Peck,
op. cit. supra note 4 at 16.
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In addition, Dunaway, in his article on comparative negligence,'
8 points out
that even though some states have had comparative negligence laws in effect for as long
as forty years, there has been no increased insurance rates in those jurisdictions.
Furthermore, actual experience has shown that juries are in fact capable of
coping with the problem of apportioning the responsibility for accidents between
the parties. New York juries have dealt with the comparative negligence problem
on many occasions, without any reported difficulty. In Fitzpatrick v. International
Railway Co., Inc.,19 for example, a plaintiff, who was injured in Ontario, Canada,
brought suit in New York against his employer, a New York Corporation. Under
conflicts of law rules, he claimed and received the benefits of the Ontario Contribu-
tory Negligence Act.20 The jury found plaintiff ten per cent negligent and judgment
was awarded accordingly. In affirming the decision unanimously, the New York
State Court of Appeals said: "Furthermore, courts of this State are not unaccus-
tomed to the application of the law of contributory negligence adopted by the On-
tario Act. We have a similar provision under section 3 of the Federal Employers'
Liability Act.' "2 1
Proponents of comparative negligence statutes have also contended that the
elimination of the absolute defense of contributory negligence would make defend-
ants more willing to settle out of court. Injured plaintiffs, faced with unpaid bills
and prospective litigation costs are frequently "forced" to make disadvantageous
settlements, while the insured defendants, freed from financial pressures are more
inclined to favor a trial on the off-chance of proving contributory negligence. Adop-
tion of the comparative negligence rule might help clear the overcrowded court
calendars and give plaintiffs whose cases must be tried, an opportunity to be heard
within a reasonable time.2 2
18 Id. at 41. In effect in Miss. (1910), Neb. (1913), Wis. (1931), S. D. (1941),
Ga. (1910); Canada: British Columbia (1925), New Brunswick (1926), Nova Scotia
(1926), Ontario (1930), Alberta (1942), Manitoba (1940), Saskatchewan (1944), Prince
Edward Is. (1938), Quebec-Civil Law (1909); England (1945).
10 252 N. Y. 127, 169 N. E. 112 (1927).
20 ONT. RaV. STAT. (1950) c. 252.
21 Act of Ap. 22 (1908), c. 149, 35 STAT. 66.
22 KreindIer, op. cit. supra note 6 at 88; Teller, op. cit. supra note 4 at 101; but
see Peck, op. cit. supra note 4 at 17.
